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Abstract 
This paper represents a short historical and theoretical analysis of the 
Romanian foreign policy at the beginning of the First World Conflagration. 
The study proposes an approach on this topic mainly from the perspective of 
realism, as a theory of international relations. The Romanian foreign policy 
during the Great War aimed to achieve the national interest, namely to receive 
the territories from the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary inhabited by a 
Romanian population. The article valorizes the thesis of the rational actor. The 
Romanian state acted as a rational actor in international relations, declaring its 
neutrality in July 1914. The Romanian government behaved as a rational actor, 
being aware of the poor supplies for the army and its low level of training. Ion 
I.C Bratianu also attempted to get certain guarantees on obtaining the 
territories under Austro-Hungarian rule. So he decided to delay the moment of 
intervention in the war as long as possible. The analysis tries to demonstrate 
that the neutrality was only a temporary one due to the geographical position 
of the country and the evolution of the war. There was also benevolent 
neutrality towards the Entente and Russia. The paper shows the reasons for 
which Romania played the role of the balancer in the Balkan area, at least until 
Bulgarian intervention in the conflict. Moreover, the article demonstrates that 
the president of the Romanian Council of ministers, Ion I. C. Bratianu enjoyed 
a real monopoly on foreign policy decisions. He adopted a bandwagoning 
behaviour, deciding to enter World War I, alongside Entente, at the moment 
he considered optimal. 
Keywords: World War I, Ion I. C. Bratianu, the balance of power, national 
interest, foreign policy, neutrality, bandwagoning, realism 
 
Introduction 
A few methodological issues 
The paper tries to make a short historical and theoretical analysis of 
the Romanian foreign policy at the beginning of World War I, mainly in the 
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first phase of Romania’s neutrality. The article starts with the thesis of the 
rationality of the state actors in international relations. This is one of the 
fundamental postulates of the realist theory.  
The study attempts to underline how the Romanian state performed as 
a rational actor in the international arena striving to achieve the national ideal. 
In the circumstances of the world conflict, the national ideal identified itself 
with the Romanian Kingdom’s national interest. The national interest referred 
to obtaining the Romanian territories, which were parts of Austria-Hungary. 
At the beginning of the world war, the decision for neutrality responded in fact 
to Romania’s national interest, because the Romanian state and particularly its 
army were not prepared for the military involvement. Or, in realism, the 
national interest is a key concept. The national interest is conceived in terms 
of power. The analysis also tries to underline some of the reasons for which 
Romania delayed as long as possible the moment of its intervention in the war.  
Thus, the Romanian state made all its best to consolidate its power, its 
capabilities. Otherwise, an intervention in the conflict would have been a 
genuine military adventure. The Romanian army was poorly equipped and 
trained. The armaments, ammunition and war materials of good quality were 
insufficient. The realist thinker Hans Morgenthau mentioned the military 
training (namely the quantity and the quality of the officer corps and those of 
the armaments) among the main elements of the national power. (Morgenthau, 
2007: 188-151) Lacking in enough power (mainly military power), the 
Romanian state was not able to fulfil the national and territorial aspirations, in 
fact, its national interest. The article also shows why the Romanian neutrality 
could not be perpetual, taking into consideration the evolution of the regional 
context. It also underlines the nature of the neutrality, the options and the 
dilemmas of the Romanian government. It demonstrates that Romania 
assumed the role of the balancer in the Balkan area. On the other hand, 
following a rule that international relations theoreticians use to highlight, the 
Romanian Kingdom resorted to a bandwagoning behaviour in the relations 
with the great powers of the Entente.  
On the contrary, Romania tended to balance Bulgaria’s power because 
the neighbour from the South of the Danube enjoyed rather similar 
capabilities. In these circumstances, the paper emphasizes Ion I. C. Bratianu’s 
primordial role as the principal decision-maker in Romanian foreign policy. 
The paper also valorizes a few previous pieces of research and studies (Gorun, 
2018: 51-41; Gorun, 2018: 225-211). 
 
Premises 
After the outbreak of the world war, the government of Bucharest had 
to choose between three solutions. The supreme goal was the support of the 
Romanian national interest. (Gorun, 2018: 212-211) These three options were: 
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the intervention on the side of the Central Powers to honour the treaty of the 
alliance signed in 1883; neutrality, to attentively and responsibly observe the 
events or the alliance with the Entente. Most of the dignitaries who attended 
the Crown Council of Sinaia( 21st July / 3rd August 1914) decided on 
neutrality because they considered that unilateral and aggressive action of 
Austria-Hungary against Serbia absolved Romania of any commitment 
assumed in the treaty of 1883. (Torrey, 1999: 10) That treaty had a quasi-secret 
character. Until the moment of the Crown Council of Sinaia, the existence of 
the treaty was unknown to the public opinion and the majority of the Romanian 
political class. King Carol I was among the very few who knew its contents. 
According to Rudolf Dinu, before the outbreak of the world war, diplomacy 
was a domain reserved for the king. The monarch was perceived, in the context 
of parliamentary life, as the sole guarantee for the continuity of the foreign 
policy. The Crown Council’s decision put an end to this state of affairs, as it 
was not following the will of the sovereign (Dinu, 2010: 9). 
 
The nature of the Romanian neutrality 
Regarding the treaty of 1883, the principle casus foederis could not 
apply because on July, 28th, 1914, the Dual Monarchy was the aggressor, not 
the victim of Serbia’s aggression. As a consequence, the treaty signed by 
Romania, renewed for the last time in 1913, became obsolete. Bucharest did 
not assume any assignment of intervention to support the Dual Monarchy. 
Taking into consideration Russia’s presence among the powers of the Entente, 
the only reasonable solution remained neutrality, at least in the beginning 
(Gorun, 2014: 69). 
The Romanian neutrality was also called military expectation with the 
defence of the frontiers (Arhiva Nationala Istorica Centrala, Fund Microfilms, 
France, roll 101, p. I: 267; Gorun, 2020: 47). But the notion of neutrality is 
preferable, as it is well known in international relations. The concept 
of military neutrality (See Iordache, 1998) is also appropriate as due to the 
intense preparations made by the Romanian Kingdom all this time. The term 
of neutrality could be more relevant because it refers to the political and legal 
status of a state refusing to intervene in a conflict and join alliances and 
military blocks. A neutral state can maintain diplomatic relations with all the 
other actors of the international system, including the belligerent ones. It is 
important to underline that, due to tactical reasons, Romania continued to 
maintain relations with the Entente, as well as with the Central Powers during 
its neutrality. (Gorun, 2018: 42) The Romanian diplomacy negotiated the 
terms of the military involvement with both alliances. The Romanian 
government strove to keep secret all the discussions concerning the accession 
to the Entente in order not to generate the suspicions of the rival military 
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alliance and to avoid an attack of the Central Powers. Therefore, later the 
Romanian state will sign a trade agreement with Germany (Ibidem: 43). 
However, there was benevolent neutrality towards the Entente. After 
Turkey’s entered the war alongside the Central Powers, Romania decided to 
ban the transportation of war materials meant for Turkey on its territory. But 
Romania had to facilitate the military transportations for Serbia. (Kiritescu, 
1940: 12) This decision represented an act of courage because it could be 
interpreted as defiance towards Germany. In fact, Romania’s declaration of 
neutrality caused discontentment in Berlin. Benevolent neutrality towards a 
belligerent block most likely represented a prelude of the accession to the 
respective alliance sooner or later. As to Romania, the next events clearly 
confirmed this tendency. (Gorun, 2018: 213) Romania’s attitude was 
determined by the promises made by the Entente regarding the fulfilment of 
the national aspirations. Implicitly, the Entente supported Romanian national 
objectives. 
But Romanian neutrality during World War I could only be temporary. 
At the crossroads of the great powers' opposite interests, Romania will be 
gradually surrounded only by belligerent states. Taking into consideration its 
position on Europe’s geopolitical map, Romania could not afford to adopt 
measures regarding permanent neutrality like Switzerland (Gorun, 2020: 47). 
 
The birth of the balance of power and realpolitik in the international 
modern system 
The failure of the idealism 
Switzerland’s neutrality status had been unanimously recognized in 
1648 when the Peace of Westphalia was signed and the modern international 
system was born. (Blin, 2006: 6-5) According to Arnaud Blin, after the 
conclusion of the peace treaty, the idea of a Christian united Europe was 
substituted by a new mechanism in international relations. This one was 
founded on the balance of powers and the lack of morality of the realpolitik. 
This realpolitik is closely related to the promotion of the national interest at 
all costs. The realist theory of international relations will valorize both 
concepts, balance of power and realpolitik. In fact, the realism paid too little 
attention to the ethical aspects (unlike the interwar idealism) when talking 
about the foreign policy objectives of a state actor. Arnaud Blin also wrote 
about a “Westphalian regime”, that was born in 1648. It will regulate the 
international politics for a few centuries to come. (Ibidem) In fact, in his 
opinion, there were just three ways to manage the power relations, namely the 
imperial hegemony, the balance of power and the collective security. The 
supreme accomplishment of the imperial hegemony was the Roman pattern 
whose multiplication was tried more times. The balance of power represented 
the tool chosen by the architects of the Westphalian treaty and particularly by 
European Scientific Journal May 2020 edition Vol.16, No.14 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
20 
its successors. The collective security that also originates in the agreements of 
Westphalia is the newest of the three modalities. The collective security is 
defined in accordance with the balance of power and tends to systematize and 
institutionalize the international relations so that the particular policies of the 
states could be coordinated with the general principles. The assumption was 
that the collective commitments of the countries had been founded on a 
security regime that was protecting the states that had assumed the respective 
commitments. This system was supported by the action of the international 
organizations which were created precisely for this goal (Ibidem: 8-7). 
The idealist liberalism specific to the inter-war period stressed the role 
of the international organizations, proposing a collective security system. If 
realism considered the balance of power as the most important method to 
avoid the war and to preserve the peace, the idealism alleged the contrary. 
According to the idealism, the balance of power was not able to prevent the 
war. Moreover, it would represent a cause for its outbreak. The League of 
Nations, an international organization founded in 1919 tended to create and 
maintain a climate favourable to cooperation and to solve all the disputes 
between the international actors peacefully. It aimed at surpassing the national 
interests that endangered peace. (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2008: 149, Guzzini, 
2000: 51-49, Steans, Pettiford, Diez, 2005: 32) The idealist thinkers expressed 
the hope that the states were capable to function as a community rather than 
autonomous entities, whose sole concern, like in realism, was to achieve their 
objectives. As the evolution of the interwar events demonstrated, the liberal 
idealism failed to represent “a proper intellectual guide” (Jackson, Sørensen, 
2010: 35) The League of Nations, an idealist project par excellence, was not 
able to maintain peace and to efficiently manage the international crisis. 
 
The Romanian state- balancer in the Balkan area 
During Romanian neutrality (1914-1916), the Balkan region was 
characterized by a special dynamic. Always loyal to a typical realistic way of 
acting, the Romanian Kingdom played the role of a balancer in the functioning 
of the Balkan balance of power during the first years of World War I. 
Bucharest assumed a similar mission in the second Balkan conflict. Romania 
intervened with the clear intention of preserving the balance of power. Defying 
Vienna, which had assumed the position of Sofia’s protector, Romania 
opposed the possibility of Bulgaria gaining too much power and consequently 
affecting the territorial status-quo. 
A victory obtained by Bulgaria over its former allies of 1912, namely 
Serbia and Greece, would have compromised the Balkan balance of power. 
The neighbour south of the Danube would have become a regional hegemonic 
power, an undesirable situation for the Romanian men of state (Gorun, 2018: 
213, Gorun, 2014: 70). 
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This paper shares Rudolf Dinu’s point of view, who affirmed that after 
the year 1900, due to geographical, strategic and ethnic reasons, the Romanian 
foreign policy was fundamentally focused on the Balkan zone. The existence 
of a numerous Romanian population in the peninsula (the Macedo-
Romanians) gave Bucharest “the ethnic pretext of a status-quo in the Balkans 
which will determine a confrontation with the Bulgarian nationalism”. (Dinu, 
2010: 11-10). The peace treaty signed in the Romanian capital on the 10th of 
August 1913 sanctioned Romania’s status as the main and the most important 
regional power. The Romanian state could enjoy freedom in the international 
arena and the right to make essential foreign policy decisions (such as the 
declaration of neutrality and later the entry in the war) when it considered it 
most favourable. Romania will continue to assume the role of balancer, 
deliberately maintaining itself in expectation and intervening only when it will 
consider there was the right moment. 
As the Russian historian GrigoriiȘkundin noticed, there are different 
opinions in historiography regarding the moment of the reorientation in the 
Romanian foreign policy. Undoubtedly this process was accelerated due to 
Vienna’s negative reaction towards the treaty of 1913, which it wanted revised 
in its favour. (Shkundin, 2012: 278) The representatives of the internal 
interventionist public opinion considered that the Russian victory in Lemberg 
(September 1914) and Italy’s entry in war (May 1915) were favourable 
occasions for the Romanian intervention easily failed by the Ion I. C. Bratianu 
government. But the role of the public opinion is not of utmost importance in 
the foreign policy of a state, as the major decisions are made by the 
governments. The Russian diplomacy insisted on Romania’s entry in the war 
during difficult moments to relieve the military pressure exerted by the Central 
Powers’ troops. Naturally, on the contrary, the internal pro-interventionist 
activity gained ground when the military situation was more favourable to the 
Allies. The governmental authorities also preferred the intervention to happen 
in a moment of military superiority of the Entente (Gorun, 2018: 214-213). 
 
Ion I. C. Bratianu’s primordial role and the bandwagoning behaviour 
This is just one reason for the adjournments of the government headed 
by Ion I. C. Bratianu. The further developments would prove that president of 
the Romanian Council of ministers was right, thus confirming his diplomatic 
tact. After King Carol’s passing, it was Ion I. C. Bratianu who became the 
main foreign policy decision-maker while Queen Mary was the strongest 
promoter of the Entente’s cause (Dinu, 2010: 14; See also Bulei, 2016). 
Ion I. C. Bratianu’s outstanding diplomatic qualities fully revealed 
during the neutrality when the diplomatic representatives of both the Entente 
and Central Powers were striving to obtain his aid. The virtues of the 
Romanian statesman were also emphasized by Grigorii Shkundin: “[…]The 
European Scientific Journal May 2020 edition Vol.16, No.14 ISSN: 1857-7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857-7431 
22 
key of Romania’s destiny was found in the pocket of the prime minister [...] 
He had a lucid and rational mind and he excellently knew to play a double 
game, making attractive promises, but ambiguous and noncommittal […]” 
(Shkundin, 2012: 277) . 
Between 1914 and 1916, proving a genuine “political despotism”, 
Bratianu watched the foreign policy of the country, not taking into account the 
viewpoints of the minister of Foreign Affairs, Emanoil Porumbaru. The 
President of the Council of Ministers used to negotiate and made major 
decisions not informing the formal leader of the diplomacy. (Shkundin, 2012: 
281). Moreover, EmanoilPorumbaru was ironically named “the minister 
foreign to affairs” (Torrey, 2014: 21) instead of the minister of foreign affairs, 
relevant proof of his insignificant role in Romanian diplomacy. The formal 
leader of the diplomacy was always in Ion I. C. Bratianu’s shadow concerning 
foreign policy decisions. In most cases, the latter preferred to talk the most 
important issues directly with the diplomatic representatives of the Entente in 
Bucharest (Shkundin, 2012: 281). 
The president of the Romanian Council of ministers did not adopt 
decisions quickly especially if they were vital for the success of the foreign 
policy of his country. Glenn E. Torrey considered Ion I. C. Bratianu to be the 
most suitable person for the diplomatic dissimulation necessary to temper the 
Central Powers, while he was discussing the terms of Romania’s military 
involvement with the Entente’s representatives. Bratianu was able to very 
rigorously calculate all the possible consequences of his moves. He often 
preferred to avoid responsibility rather than make a decision with fatal 
repercussions (Torrey, 2014: 20). 
The agreement with Italy in September 1914, renewed in February 
1915, concerning the conditions of renouncing neutrality for the two states is 
not surprising, the head of the government himself havingcompared 
Romania’s struggle for unity to that of Italy. Bratianu was aware of the 
importance of his mission. At the end of 1912, after the new development in 
the relations with the great republic of the West, he declared to the French 
plenipotentiary minister Jean-Camille Blondel that the Austro-Hungarian 
dualist empire would suffer a dissolution and: “that is why we have to be 
prepared […] to receive our brothers from Transylvania.” (Ibidem: 21-20). In 
the years of the Great War, Ionel Bratianu managed to exert a growing 
influence on the Royal House (on King Ferdinand I and Queen Mary as well), 
through the agency of the Prince Barbu Stirbey, the administrator of the Crown 
land. The latter became the close adviser of the king, a kind of “political 
guardian” of the monarch between 1914 and 1918. (Ibidem: 22-21) Glenn 
Torrey also emphasised Ion I. C. Bratianu’s accuracy of the predictions. The 
American historian considered that after the French victory on the river Marne 
(6th September - 13th September) which saved Paris, Bratianu foresaw the 
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Entente’s final triumph. Later, animated by this conviction, he tried to fulfil 
the Romanian national program through all foreign policy démarches (Torrey, 
1999: 14). 
In Rudolf Dinu’s opinion, in the beginning, Bratianu tried to avoid 
participation in the conflict using the neutrality solution. Then, the Romanian 
man of state adopted a bandwagoning behaviour, deciding to enter the war 
alongside the more powerful camp, at the optimal moment (Dinu, 2010: 15-
14, Gorun, 2018: 215-213). 
Usually, in their relations with great powers, the weaker states incline 
towards bandwagoning, rather than balancing. In relations with actors with 
similar power, these states will rather opt for balancing. (Cioculescu in Walt, 
2008: 28) It is what the officials of Bucharest preferred regarding Bulgaria (a 
state with military capabilities quite similar to those of Romania). But in its 
relations with the Entente’s states, the Romanian Kingdom naturally chose to 
adopt a bandwagoning behaviour. When a state actor or an alliance has the 
biggest chances of winning in a conflict, the states prefer to join the stronger 
camp, rather than form coalitions. In these circumstances, the states will opt 
for bandwagoning (Waltz, 2006: 176). 
The first scholars who used the bandwagoning notion as opposed to 
the term of balancing in the theory of international relations were Quincy 
Wright and Stephen Van Evera. (Wright, cited in Waltz, 2006: 176) A 
representative of the defensive neorealism, Keneth Waltz made a distinction 
between the bandwagoning behaviour in the internal affairs and that adopted 
by the state actors in their foreign policy. In the second case, the states make 
greater efforts to maximize their power or find allies, should they find 
themselves at disadvantage: “In a competition for the position of leader, the 
balancing is the correct behaviour where the victory of a coalition over the 
other leaves the weaker members of the winning coalition at the discretion of 
the stronger ones. None does want someone else to win; no great power wants 
one of them to impose itself as the leader.” (Waltz, 2006: 177) The last phrase 
is relevant: “no great power wants one of them to impose itself as the 
leader.”Of course, the situation is quite similar during the First World 
Conflagration and immediately after its end. Although they were Russia’s 
allies, Great Britain and France did not want the former to consolidate its 
influence and to extend the control over the Balkans and Eastern Europe. 
Later, on the eve of the Peace Conference, Great Britain was afraid of the 
French possible claims related to the hegemony over the European continent. 
These fears were not realistic due to the huge effort of war made by France. 
After the success of the Bolshevik revolution, the civil war will outbreak in 
Russia. It may be surprising that Germany, defeated and punished due to the 
tough provisions of the peace treaty, will threaten the status-quo established at 
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Versailles and will eventually destroy the international order and stability 
(Gorun, 2018: 48-47). 
Romania will decide to intervene in the war on the side of the 
Quadruple Alliance (a name it received after Italy’s entry in conflict, during 
the spring of 1915), in a favourable moment to the latter, when the final victory 
had become more clear. From this perspective, a state joins the stronger part 
intending to share with it the advantages and benefits after the achievement of 
the final victory. (Walt, 2008: 61) Romania’s and Italy’s options for foreign 
policy and alliance in World War I are relevant for this type of bandwagoning. 
(Taylor, 1989: 90-88 cited in Walt, 2008: 61) Each was promised territorial 
awards at the expense of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, as a reward 
for the participation in the war. The weak states, unlike the great powers, 
express a special interest in the neighbouring powers. They are concerned 
mainly about the events which take place in the proximity of their borders. 
Moreover, weak state actors can balance when they are threatened by states 
with quite similar capabilities. Actually, they tend to bandwagon when they 
feel that their security and territorial integrity are endangered by a great power. 
(Walt, 2008: 71) The policy of balancing Bulgaria’s power, adopted by the 
Bucharest government is relevant. 
However, if we take into consideration the main hypothesis regarding 
bandwagoning, approached by Stephen Walt, Romania’s alliance with the 
Russian empire is not surprising. Thus, for the Romanian Kingdom, Russia 
represented the most serious external threat. According to Walt, the states are 
inclined to join the most menacing power. The closer a great power is, from a 
geographical point of view, the more inclined are the neighbouring states to 
form a coalition with that great power. (Ibidem: 75) Russia was situated in 
Romania’s immediate proximity. Therefore, the alliance between Romania 
and Russia starting with 4/17th August 1916, as a result of the bandwagoning 
policy of the former does not appear very surprising in this context. 
 
Conclusion 
The Romanian Kingdom declared its neutrality on 21 July/3 August 
1914, acting as a rational actor regarding international relations. The reasons 
for the decisions of the Romanian governmental authorities were the 
precariousness of the military training and the poor equipment with war 
materials and ammunition. Moreover, the government of Bucharest had to 
obtain clear guarantees concerning the recognition of its territorial claims. The 
way of action of the Romanian state was typical realistic, trying to make the 
most important decisions in the moments it considered to be optimal. 
In its foreign policy, Romania alternated between armed neutrality 
while defending the frontiers (in fact benevolent neutrality towards the 
Entente) and bandwagoning behaviour. Therefore, the government headed by 
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Ion I. C. Bratianu decided to join the Entente when the chances to win the war 
were greater.  
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